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I. Introduction* 
Continental European countries have by and large not been able to successfully address the un­
employment issue. This is the case even though there is a widespread consensus that most of conti­
nental European unemployment is of structural nature in the sense that merely injecting additional 
goods demand into the economies will quickly run into supply-side bottlenecks and will face swift 
punishment by international financial markets (OECD, 1998). t Thus, wage pressure and inflation 
can pick up, easily necessitating a return to a restrictive demand policy, which would in tum let 
unemployment rise again. Given that unemployment in continental Europe generally displays 
asymmetric persistence, the level of unemployment could very well be even higher after such an 
experiment. Expansionary demand policy without a strong backing by supply-side reforms therefore 
makes little sense. 
Furthermore, rigid labor markets along with generous welfare states are usually blamed as the core 
institutions preventing a better employment performance.2 However, political-economy con­
siderations make clear that deregulating labor markets and reforming welfare states is a daunting 
political task (Saint-Paul, 1998). This is the case because the distributional effects of such measures 
are in Europe generally perceived to be unfair and because they would hurt entrenched insiders 
which are usually the pivotal group in elections.3 While labor-market and welfare-state reforms 
should stay high up on the agenda for economic policy, it is therefore important to check whether 
there exist alternative, possibly complementary routes for fighting structural unemployment.4 
A prime difference between continental Europe and the U.S. is the much higher rate ofjob creation 
in the U.S., which is not restricted to low-paid service-sector jobs and can thus hardly be fully 
accounted for by more flexible labor markets and a more restrictive welfare-state regime (McKin­
sey, 1994; Acemoglu, 1999). The U.S. neither fits the simple notion of creating more employment 
on essentially a given capital stock by reducing real wages, i.e., moving downward on a given labor 
demand curve, nor does the widening of the wage distribution which helped low-qualified workers 
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I This paper deals with the question of whether capital-market imperfections exacerbate structural unemployment 

and not with the also interesting issue how they affect cyclical fluctuations. 

2 See Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Lindbeck (1996), Fehn (1997), Caballero and Hammour (1998), and 

Blanchard and Wolfers (1999). 

3 This general perception notwithstanding, it is not at all clear whether such a policy would indeed favor capital at 

the expense oflabor in the long run. The appropriation model ofCaba\lero and Hammour (1998) along with recent 

empirical evidence in favor a long-run elasticity of substitution between capital and labor which exceeds the thresh­

old value of one (Berthold, Fehn, and Thode 2000) demonstrate that the labor share as well as real wages in effi­

ciency units could in fact rise in the long run. 

4 The importance of the complementarity of reforms has in particular been stressed by Coe and Snower (1997). 

to get a regular job seem to be the whole story (Nickell and Bell, 1995). The U.S. is also much 

better at creating average and high-paid jobs. This stylized fact should be also related to factors 

other than more flexible labor markets and a more restrictive welfare state, such as investment, 

innovation and establishing new firms.s Interestingly, all these factors are closely linked to the 

functioning of capital markets, where institutional differences between the U.S. and continental 

Europe are about as stark as on labor markets and between welfare state regimes. Nonetheless, 

leading publications on continental European unemployment give close to no consideration to these 

factors and to the striking differences in institional structures on capital markets.6 

The real effects of imperfect capital markets have of course received quite a bit of attention in the 

literature in recent years.7 However, the focus was either on how they affect business cycles and 

financial crises or on their effects on economic growth. Hence, the time dimension has been either 

short run or long run. What is largely missing is an investigation of their real effects in the medium 

run, which is the appropriate time perspective for European unemployment (Blanchard, 1997). This 

is surprising because economic intuition suggests that there are a number of channels through which 

imperfect capital markets might aggravate structural unemployment. The present paper attempts to 

fill this gap. 

To this end, the paper is organized as follows. The second chapter points out intuitively the links 

between the institutional structure on capital markets and labor-market performance. The third chap­

ter presents the structure of a macroeconomic model relating unemployment to imperfect labor and 

capital markets. It captures the key effect that imperfect capital markets exacerbate structural unem­

ployment that is created by malfunctioning labor markets. The fourth chapter presents a cross­

country panel analysis to estimate the relative importance ofdifferences in institutional structures on 

labor and capital markets in explaining different national labor-market performances. Finally, the 

fifth chapter presents conclusions for economic policy. 

II. How do capital-market institutions affect structural unemployment? 
The institutional structure of capital markets varies considerably between the Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the U.S. and the UK and continental Europe. While the stock market along with a booming 
venture capital market playa central role in the former countries, the latter countries can be crudely 
characterized as being bank based (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). Firms in continental Europe rely to 
a much larger degree on debt financing via banks and there are still extensive cross share holdings 
5 Another very important fonn of investment in this respect is of course human capital fonnation. However, as in­

vestment into human capital has very peculiar problems, it is abstracted from in this paper. 

6 Primary examples are Layard and Nickell, and Jackman (1991), and Blanchard (1997). 

7 See e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos 

(1998), and Carlin and Mayer (1999). 
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between banks and especially large firms.s This and proxy voting causes control of firms to rest 
largely with banks rather than with the public as shareholders at large or institutional investors such 
as pension funds. The capitalization of the stock market relative to GDP and the size of the venture 
capital market are much lower in continental European countries compared to Anglo-Saxon coun­
tries.9 Hence, firms in Anglo-Saxon countries enjoy considerably better access to risk-bearing 
capital which, however, is sometimes deemed to be impatient compared to credits from closely 
associated banks (Hall and Soskice, 1999). 
While this has been the common way of grouping institutional structures on capital markets for 
quite some time, recent research has shown that another fruitful, but after all related approach 
consists in distinguishing countries according to the degree to which laws and their enforcement 
effectively protect the providers of equity and debt capital from ex-post appropriation by firms, i.e., 
by management and workers. to Four groups of countries emerge according to their legal heritage: 
French, Scandinavian and German civil law countries and the Anglo-Saxon common law countries. 
It is important to note that such countries as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are grouped among the 
German civil law countries. Generally, Anglo-Saxon common law countries provide the best effec­
tive protection of financiers with the notable exception that countries where the legislation on 
capital markets stems from German civil law display the strictest protection of creditors. Hence, 
Anglo-saxon countries have institutional structures for financing firms which are superior in both 
respects compared to French and Scandinavian countries, but compared to German countries they 
tend to have a comparative institutional advantage only in equity and venture capital financing and 
not in debt financing where the reverse holds (Carlin and Mayer, 1999). 
The open research question concerns the real effects of such differences in particular with respect to 
the situation on the labor market in the medium run. The renowned Modigliani-Miller irrelevance 
theorem states that the financial structure of firms should have no real effects under perfect capital 
markets (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, a wide array of empirical and theoretical contri­
butions have shown by now that the Modigliani-Miller theorem is unlikely to hold and that fmanc­
ing decisions and even more so institutional structures on capital markets have real repercussions in 
the way that they affect business cycles, financial crises, and economic growth. From a theoretical 
perspective, deviations from the Modigliani-Miller theorem can be justified by capital-market 
imperfections, in particular by theories of asymmetric information, of control and of commitment 
(Carlin and Mayer, 1999). Institutional factors are the prime candidate for explaining intercountry 
differences. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the level of and changes in the structural rate of 
unemployment are also affected by differences in institutional structures on capital markets. 
8 This might change in particular in Gennany with the tax refonn that has just been passed allowing corporate finns 

to sell stakes in other finns without paying capital gains taxes anymore. 

9 See Black and Gilson (1998), and Carlin and Mayer (1999). 
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The key microeconomic problems on capital markets are moral hazard and adverse selection which 
are due to asymmetric information between the investor and the financier. These phenomena can 
give rise not only to credit and equity rationing but also to inefficient liquidations of financially 
constrained firms with sound fundamentals. I I Standard microsolutions like posting collateral or 
writing sophisticated, possibly state-contingent contracts are usually either not feasible or only 
alleviate but do not solve the problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1992). Banks and stock markets are two 
institutions which are designed to lower the arising inefficiencies by providing monitoring, selec­
tion, and control services. Nonetheless, capital-market imperfections and liquidity constraints are 
empirically important phenomena as can be seen, e.g., by investment into fixed capital depending 
positively on cash flow even after controlling for investment opportunities. 12 
The stylized consequence of rationing on the capital market is a wedge between the marginal pro­
ductivity of investment, be it new or continuation investment, and the interest rate (Hubbard, 1998). 
Hence, the larger this wedge becomes, the greater is the negative effect on investment into fixed 
capital, into R&D, into innovations, and into new firms. Furthermore, inefficient liquidations of 
fundamentally sound firms become more likely as it becomes more difficult for such firms to ac­
quire financing of continuation investments in times of distress. All these five types of investment 
are linked to the efficiency ofthe capital market and they are furthermore important determinants of 
labor demand. A low overall effective protection of financiers against ex-post appropriation by 
workers and management, such as is the case in French and Scandinavian law countries relative to 
Anglo-Saxon countries, makes financiers more reluctant to enter into joint projects. It can thus be 
expected to increase total rationing on the capital market and to exert a negative effect on labor 
demand and on job creation. 
However, when comparing the German law countries with the Anglo-Saxon countries things be­
come more complicated. Investment into fixed capital can in principle lower unemployment by 
raising the marginal productivity of labor if growth of real wage costs lags behind. Since fixed 
capital can usually serve quite well as collateral, this kind of investment is also the one among the 
five types of investment which is most easily financed by incurring debt. It is therefore not surpris­
ing that German law countries such as Germany itself or Japan display comparatively high rates of 
fixed capital investment (Carlin and Mayer, 1999). It is however questionable whether fixed capital 
investment of in particular large, established firms is a promising route for achieving employment 
growth in highly developed OECD countries nowadays. First, a large part of this kind of investment 
takes place in the industrial sector where at best only very limited employment growth can be 
expected due to the general patterns of structural change. Second, this type of investment takes place 
10 See La Porta et at. (1997), (1998). (1 999a), and (l999b). 

II See Blanchard (1999). Caballero and Harnmour (1999), and HeIlmann and Stiglitz (2000). 

12 See e.g. Hubbard (1998). Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). 
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in already existing finns, where entrenchend insiders particularly in the highly regulated continental 
European labor markets are in a good position to convert a rising marginal productivity of labor into 
wage increases for themselves rather than into employment gains (Lindbeck, 1996). Fixed capital 
investment was an important component of employment growth in the catch-up phase after the war 
when radical innovations by the leading industrial nations could basically be mimicked. But the 
more a country moves to the frontier of economic development, the less simple investment into 
fixed capital suffices for achieving employment growth. This fits well with the observation that 
countries such as Gennany and Japan seem to have benefited from its institutional setup on the 
capital market for a long time, but that this has become more doubtful in the course of the last 
twenty years. 
Key aspects for achieving employment growth in highly developed countries and thus in later stages 
of economic development appear to be the ability to finance R&D, to orchestrate radical product 
innovations, and to establish new finns. This is in particular true if employment growth is not only 
to take place in the fonn of low-paid service sector jobs. The type of investment rather than its pure 
level appears to make a difference for the effects on employment. Incremental or process innova­
tions in industries where the main technological breakthroughs essentially occurred either at the end 
of last century or during the first half of this century are hardly avenues for achieving major em­
ployment gains anymore. Expanding employment in the production of largely standardized indus­
trial products is difficult partially due to globalization and rapidly advancing labor-saving techno­
logical progress in this area. Rather, employment growth is more easily achieved in the service 
sector or in the production of new and niche products which are often technologically advanced. A 
particularly important source of employment growth in the 1990s have been investments in infor­
mation technology. However, investments in infonnation technology largely produce intangible 
assets which cannot serve as collateral so that countries which have trouble in adequately financing 
such high-risk ventures by means of equity or venture capital have an inherent disadvantage in 
obtaining employment growth in the thriving infonnation-technology sector compared to the Anglo­
Saxon countries. 
A large flow of newly created finns affects employment positively through a number of channels. 
First, new finns enhance competition on the goods market which reduces markups thus raising labor 
demand. Furthennore, new finns facilitate structural change and in particular the transition to the 
service sector, so that countries which foster the creation of new finns should have fewer problems 
in managing the transition to a more service- and infonnation-technology-based economy. Finally, 
as new finns do not have insiders yet, a large flow ofnew finns undennines the bargaining power of 
insiders on the labor market thus producing more real wage restraint. This effect is reinforced by the 
rise in the real wage elasticity of labor demand which a vibrant market for founding new finns 
·5· 
brings about (Krueger and Pischke, 1997). A higher short-run real wage elasticity of labor demand 
shifts the utility-maximizing decision of unions in face of the trade off between real wages and 
employment, which exists due to a downward-sloped labor demand curve in the short to medium 
run, toward more employment. 13 The incentive of workers to join unions therefore falls because the 
premium that unions achieve over the market-clearing real wage decreases. 
This assessment is reinforced by the observation that more deregulated labor markets with weaker 
unions, less generous unemployment benefits, and lower firing costs tend to be accompanied by an 
elaborate protection of shareholders and well-developed venture-capital markets across countries 
and vice versa. 14 At least two possible explanations exist for this connection. First, governments 
might have struck a more or less explicit politico-economic deal with insiders on labor and capital 
markets in corporatist countries against the interest of financiers to curtail competition on both 
markets. Second, the more workers are also capitalists themselves by being invested directly or via 
pension funds in the stock market, the greater is their own interest in a high yield on capital and the 
lower is their incentive to fight at all costs for maintaining rigid labor markets. 
Having pointed out that R&D, product innovations, and new firms are likely to be major determi­
nants of an economy's success in terms of employment nowadays, it is important to realize that 
these are all high-risk activities where problems of asymmetric information loom large and where 
the project itself usually does not constitute viable collateral. 15 It is also the case that the failure rate 
among such projects will generally be high while the few successful ones are likely to produce large 
profits for a considerable time span. R&D, product innovations, and new firms are therefore par­
ticularly dependent on a well-functioning capital market. First, the institutional structure on the 
capital market must be suitable for handling problems of asymmetric information. Second, it must 
be able to provide funding to highly risky projects without receiving much in the way of collateral. 
Third, as it is highly uncertain which projects will be successful it must be able to sort and provide 
financing to a very large number of projects, and there must also be the possibility to abandon 
projects quickly once their failure becomes apparent. Fourth, the capital market must provide a 
suitable environment for financiers to convert successful projects into cash for themselves, e.g., by 
going public. It must prevent workers and management from breaching the ex-ante agreed upon 
terms of trade by arbitrarily reducing ex post payments to financiers. These conditions are arguably 
more likely to be fulfilled on stock-market and venture-capital based capital markets with a high 
effective legal protection of equity holders and venture capitalists in contrast to bank-based capital 
13 In the long run after capital has fully adjusted to any shock, labor demand is anyway either flat or even slightly 

upward sloping, so that the trade off between real wages and employment disappears (Caballero and Hammour, 

1998; Berthold, Fehn, and Thode, 2000). However, such long-run considerations are less relevant for political orga­

nizations like unions than short-run effects ofwage hikes. 

14 See Pagano and Volpin (1999). and Fehn and Meier (2000). 

15 See Guiso (1997), Brown (1997), and Weigand and Audretsch (1999). 
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markets where debt financing is predominant. 16 Equity holders and venture capitalists participate 
fully in the profits of successful projects so that they are more willing than providers of debt capital 
to finance highly risky projects. It is furthermore easier in stock-market based capital markets to go 
public and the number of projects that are initially financed is larger. Empirically, there is indeed a 
positive relationship between innovation activity and founding new firms on the one hand and in 
particular the availability of venture capital on the other hand. 17 Hence, a well-developed effective 
legal protection of shareholders and a thriving venture capital market might have become more 
important over time for achieving a high level ofemployment. 18 
III. Imperfect labor and capital markets in a macromodel 
The purpose of this section is to present the structure of a simple macromodel which formally 
captures the gist of the above argument, namely that capital market imperfections exacerbate struc­
tural unemployment which is caused by labor-market rigidities.19 The model is based on the idea 
that employment is only possible if entrepreneurs, workers, and financiers enter into joint produc­
tion units and that contractual relationships between entrepreneurs and workers as well as between 
entrepreneurs and financiers are all but perfect. In particular, both relationships usually require some 
relationship-specific investment and are therefore open to the well-known hold-up problem, i.e., 
workers as well as management may wield the power to at least partially appropriate capital ex post, 
assuming that capital undergoes the greatest transformation and becomes most relationship-specific 
. once invested. In other words, if capital is largely sunk after being invested and if the legal envi­
ronment does not put great emphasis on protecting capital from ex-post appropriation by workers 
and management, rational financiers will already ex ante erect a high threshold value for the profit­
ability of projects they are asked to finance. This is the case because they know that management 
and workers will ex post try to renegotiate payments to production factors to their detriment. For 
that part of the capital which is sunk and not collateralized, financiers will ex post only receive part 
of the accruing rents which the project produces. The size of the payments hinges on the ex post 
relative bargaining power of production factors and, of course, on the size of the rents, but not on 
the opportunity costs of this part of the capital which is sunk. 
16 See Black and Gilson (1998), La Porta et al. (1999a), Fehn (2000), and OECD (2000). 

11 See OECD (1996), and Kortum and Lerner (1998), and Hellmann and Puri (1999). 

IS Acemoglu (2000) presents a model which shows formally that economies with better functioning financial mar­

kets can be expected to display a superior employment performance in times ofrapid structural change. Such 

economies are able to finance the creation ofnew firms via the external capital market, e.e., via venture capital. 

whereas firms in the other economies with less well functioning financial markets have to rely mostly on selffi­

nancing. Hence, job creation will lag behind as the process ofstructiJral change is impeded from the creation side. 

19 The presented macromodel is based on Caballero and Hammour (1998) and especially (1999). We do not want to 

pretend that we add anything to their models. The sole purpose of this section is to briefly show how two of the 

transmission channels of the previous section from capital markets to structural unemployment. i.e., lack of creation 

and ofcontinuation investment, can be formalized. 
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The model economy is composed of three sets of agents: Entrepreneurs, workers, and financiers. 

The discount rate r is assumed to be the same for all three types of agents and is therefore equal to 

the market discount rate as all agents are assumed to be risk neutral. New production units (firms) 

are infinitesimally small and they combine in fixed proportions an entrepreneurial idea, one unit of 

labor, and k units ofcapital. They are only created ifall three agents enter into a joint project. There 

is a continuum of mass one of infinitely-lived workers who in offering their one unit of labor maxi­

mize their expected present value of instantaneous utility, which depends linearly on consumption 

and labor supplied .. Entrepreneurs are the only ones who have access to projects. Entrepreneurs are 

indexed by i and maximize their expected present value of consumption. Each entrepreneur i dis­

poses of financial assets worth ci which he commits to the project. If ci < ki ' project i can only be 

realized if an external financier makes up for the remainder hi =k i - C j .20 External financing is 

assumed to take place via a competitive non-resource consuming financial sector. External financing 

may be required for starting new projects or for helping already existing firms in situations of 

financial distress, Le., during periods ofnegative cash flow. 

Projects produce a homogeneous durable output good that can either be consumed or used as capi­

tal. The output flow ofproduction unit i at time t is given by: 

(1) 
VII L[- v, v] reflects the specific productivity of unit i at date t which is decreasing in the age of the 
production unit, and E;{ is a transitory idiosyncratic shock, which alternates with probability _' 
0< A < I, between the good state of the world, £+ > 0 , and the bad state of the world,£- <O. 
Firms can fail because they are getting outdated or due to negative idiosyncratic shocks. Initial 
wealth of entrepreneur i is assumed to be independent of the project's initial specific productivity 
Vi' The marginal densities of projects' productivities and of projects' financing requirements are 
given by j(v) and g(b) respectively. 
It is for simplicity assumed that all of the invested capital becomes specific to the project in the 
sense that it completely loses its value if the project is abandoned prematurely. This gives rise to 
contractual difficulties in the employment and financing relationships.21 Insiders, Le., workers and 
management, may attempt to acquire a greater share of the quasi-rents that are produced within the 
nexus of the firm than was agreed upon ex ante thus appropriating capital. Labor and management 
20 means that the firm has positive intema1 funds.
'--___-.I 
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cannot credibly precommit not to withhold their human capital from production once the production 
unit has been formed and capital has become fully specific to it and is sunk. Assuming imperfect 
legal protection of providers of capital and that fully state contingent contracts are either unenforce­
able or too complex, specific quasi-rents will be divided up according to the parties' ex post and not 
the ex ante terms of trade. 
The ex-post division of rents between labor and capital is taken to be governed by continuous-time 
Nash bargaining. Labor therefore not only obtains at time t its opportunity costs w; of participating 
in the production unit, but also a share j3 L (0,1) of the present value S of the unit's specific quasi-
rents, sit: 
(2) 

The size of reflects the relative ex-post bargaining power of workers vis-Ii-vis entrepreneurs and 
financiers. These are taken together as capital and receive (1- f3)s . The quasi-rents of production 
unit i are given by: 
(3) 

The opportunity costs of labor w; consist ofa stock and a flow component. The latter is the level of 
unemployment benefits wh , while the former is the present value of the increase in human wealth 
that an unemployed worker can expect to receive if he finds a new job which is given by j3E (S, ) . 
The probability of reemployment is gross hiring HI divided by total unemployment V, . Hence: 
w; =HI j3E(SI)+wh • (4)
U, 
Total unemployment is by definition equal to VI = 1-NI ,where N, represents total employment at 
time t. This amount is given by adding up both, employment in firms which enjoy the good state and 
those which find themselves in the bad state of the world. The densities of the these two kinds of 
units are represented by n 
l
+ (b, v) and n; (b, v) respectively. The total number of units at time t is 
therefore given by: 
+v +x +v +x )N, =N,+ + N,- = _ n,+ (b, v)dbdv + _ n; (b, v dbdv (5) 
-v -x -v -x 
Since one unit of production is by the assumption of a limitational production function restricted to 
using one unit of labor, the total number of firms is equal to aggregate employment. Production 
units are continuously created and destroyed. Creation of new firms takes place whenever the 
following two necessary conditions are satisfied: The unit must be profitable and it must obtain 
2l The use ofcollateral could ofcourse attenuate the contractual difficulties. However, the essence of the argument is 
valid as long as the financier does not receive full collateral. 
·9· 
financing. Profits to be shared by the entrepreneur and the financier of unit i in period t are given . 
by: 
(6) 
However. whether or not to create a new production unit depends not on one period profits, but 
rather on the total discounted value of future profits. As this value differs according to the current 
idiosyncratic state of the world, we define it to be either rr; (biPVi,) or rr~ (bit'vjJ. We assume that 
parameter values are such that new firms are only created if this particular unit is currently in the 
good state of the world. Both discounted profit functions are decreasing in b, because a higher b 
increases the risk of privately inefficient liquidation, i.e., an in principle profitable production unit 
must be shut down in a situation of financial distress because financiers are not willing to inject 
additional liquidity into it. A unit is profitable if the expected present value of future profits is at 
least as large as the setup cost: 
k ;5; rr; (b,v). (7) 
New units furthermore need to be financed. The financial relationship is assumed to suffer from an 
equivalent problem as the employment relationship. The viability of the project depends on the 
cooperation of the entrepreneur, i.e., on his human capital. However, the entrepreneur cannot credi­
bly precommit not to withdraw his participation ex post. He can always ex post threaten to stop 
working in which case the invested capital loses all its value as it is assumed to be fully sunk. Ex 
post Nash bargaining between the entrepreneur and the financier is assumed to lead to the ex-ante 
known result that the entrepreneur receives the share aL (0,1) of the present value of profits _' 
while the financier gets the remainder (1- a)rr . Even if the two parties, entrepreneur and financier, 
agree ex ante upon a set of larger payments to the financier, the entrepreneur will ex post, after the 
capital is sunk, always dispose over the bargaining power to renegotiate payments to the financier 
down to (1 - a)rr and he will in fact in any event do so. Hence, a new unit can at most incur the 
following amount ofnet uncollateralized liabilities: 
b=k -c ~ (l-a)n;(b, v,). (8) 
The greater is the initial productivity Vi ofunit i, that is about to be established, the more likely it is 
that the financing constraint is the one that is binding and vice versa. This can be seen immediately 
with the aid offigure 1, which assumes that VI < V2 ,and which incorporates the aforementioned fact 
that rr;(b,v) is decreasing in b. Hence, bP(vJ is the maximum amount of net uncollateralized 
liabilities a new unit of initial·specific productivity VI can sustain due to the profitability constraint, 
while bI (v2 ) is the respective amount for a new unit with initial specific productivity v2 due to the 
financial constraint. 
• 10­
Figure 1: Financing versus profitability constraint in creation investment 
nil b 
So~rce: Caballero and Hammour (1999, 11). 

Continuation investment is required whenever cash flows of an existing production unit are nega­

tive, which is assumed to be always the case in the bad state. Continuation investment again faces a 

profitability and a financial constraint. The profitability constraint simply states that the expected 

discounted value of all future profits must still be positive: 

n;(b,vt»O. (9) 
If the profitability constraint is no longer satisfied, privately efficient or "Schumpeterian" destruc­
tion of this very unit takes place. Whether this destruction is also socially efficient depends crucially 
on the ability of the economy to create new units and to thus reallocate the released production 
factors into new firms. Badly functioning labor and financial markets are important factors that can 
make privately efficient destruction of firms socially inefficient because they reduce the mobility of 
labor and they raise the contractual difficulties in founding new firms. This raises the probability 
that the workers who are released from the destroyed unit are not reallocated to working in a new 
firm but rather remain trapped in unemployment. 
The financial constraint for refinancing a distressed unit displays the important feature of a wedge 
between the option values to the entrepreneur and to the financier of refinancing a distressed firm. 
This option value to the entrepreneur of covering negative cash flow in the bad state of nature is in 
the absence of financing constraints, i.e., for b. -x , obtained by solving the following Bellman 
equation for n;(-x, v,): 
rn;(-x,VI )= nl- +A[n:(-X,vl )-n;(-x,VI)' (10) 
Hence this option is worth: 
-( ) n-(v.)+ An:(-X.VI)n -x v = . (11) 
I 'I r+A 
- I) ­
However, due to the above argument, once the unit is back in the good state, the entrepreneur would 
always renegotiate the debt down to: 
J)f (V,)= (t -a)n;[J)f (v,) v,], (12) 
so that the financier's option value of injecting additional money into a financially distressed unit is 
no greater than: 
-f r,-f( ) 1= n-(v, )+A(l-a)n; ~f (v,) v,]n, p v, v, 1 ' (13)
r+A 
which is obviously smaller than the entrepreneur's option value of refinancing. This inability ofthe 
financier to capture the full set of rents that are associated with refinancing a distressed unit is the. 
basic rationale for why liquidations take place although they are not only socially but also privately 
inefficient. Hence, the greater contractual difficulties are and the more indebted firms already are, 
the more likely it is that such inefficient liquidations occur. 
Concerning the level of structural (quasi-equilibrium) unemployment, the model has the following 
implications.22 For structural unemployment to occur, it is a necessary condition that the labor 
market is imperfect and that workers dispose over the market power to appropriate part of the rents 
which are created in production units. Factors contributing to such labor-market rigidities are high 
firing costs, strong unions, and generous unemployment benefits. This rent component in wages, 
which is due to contracting impediments in the labor market, upsets the free-entry condition for new 
firms. It reduces the expected profitability of committing capital to new production units below the 
return required by capital markets. This disequilibrium situation is resolved by an increase in struc­
tural unemployment, which is induced by lower creation of new finris. The rise in structural unem­
ployment and the decrease in hiring lead to higher unemployment duration U / H , thus lowering the 
opportunity costs of labor. This offsets rent appropriation by workers, and restores the rate of return 
required by the capital market for capital to enter into new joint production units or refinancing 
distressed firms. In this quasi-equilibrium with structural unemployment actual wages inclusive of 
the rent component can fall below the wage in the efficient market clearing reference situation. This 
possibility arises because creation incentives as well as the opportunity costs of labor are lower, and 
inefficient units can survive longer thus inducing sclerosis and reducing productivity growth. These 
effects occur because inefficient destruction lowers the opportunity costs of labor thus reducing the 
pressure on inefficient firms to close down. 
If only the capital market is imperfect, though, there is no structural unemployment. This is the case 
because the lower degree of creation and the higher rate of inefficient, i.e., spurious destruction of 
firms due to capital-market imperfections, are fully and immediately absorbed by a falling compen­
sation of labor under perfect labor markets. However, in case of imperfect labor markets and rent 
2l For different parametric solutions of the model, see Caballero and Hammour (I 999). 
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appropriation of workers, financial constraints further aggravate structural unemployment. The 
reduction in the steady-state demand for labor, that an imperfect capital market gives rise to via less 
creation and spurious destruction, is not fully and immediately absorbed by lower real wages if 
workers possess the ex-post bargaining power to appropriate capital. Hence, concerning the quasi­
equilibrium level of structural unemployment, capital-market contraints exacerbate the effect of 
rigid labor market. 
The degree to which the legal environment protects financiers from ex-post appropriation by work­
ers and management therefore not only has an important influence on the capability of an economy 
to create new units, but also to avoid excessive and wasteful destruction of in fact profitable firms. 
This latter effect is in particular problematic as it not only directly reduces the steady-state demand 
for labor but also because it lowers productivity growth due to sclerosis effects. The hypothesis for 
the empirical analysis is therefore straightforward. It is conjectured that capital-market imperfec­
tions give rise to less employment and a higher level of structural unemployment in a cross-country 
panel analysis, even when controlling for the key institutional variables on the labor market. Meas­
ures of the degree to which capital markets are imperfect are inter alia the effective legal protection 
of shareholders and creditors as well as the availability of venture capital. 
IV. Empirical investigation 
1. Data and stylized facts 
,In order to test empirically for the conjectured impact of capital-market institutions and especially 
venture capital on labor-market performance, we employ a panel of twenty OECD countries, namely 
Austria (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), 
Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NET), Norway (NOR), Portugal (POR), Spain (SPA), 
Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CAN), United States (USA), 
Japan (JAP), Australia (AUL), and New Zealand (NEW), using three kinds of data. Since our goal is 
to gain a comprehensive image, we enrich our analysis by referring to several indicators of both the 
labor and capital market stance and of capital- and labor-market institutions. First, we use two 
macroeconomic indicators on total economy unemployment and employment. Second, we introduce 
a standard set of institutional labor and product market variables. Third, and this is less standard, we 
complement our analysis by referring to selected venture capital time series and institutional capital 
market variables. The sample we use is based on annual data and ranges from 1986 to 1999. All 
relevant labor market and capital market variables are explained in Table 1 (p.31).23 
23 Like Blanchard and Wolfers (1999). we followed the principle of using as much variation in the institutional vari­
ables as possible in constructing our unbalanced panel data set. Taking logarithms of the time series under investiga­
tion did not change our regression results significantly. The corresponding results are available on request from the 
authors. 
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In order to convey a broad brush view on the data set and some of the possible correlations two 
scatter plots are presented in Figure 2. It shows cross-plots of our measure for total economy em­
ployment against early stage venture capital investment (INVEARL Y) and venture capital including 
expansion investment (VC). All variables are averaged over the period 1986 to 1999. In addition, 
we fit a tentative bivariate regression of employment on venture capital and a constant, which is 
represented by the straight line in each scatter plot. The least squares method, though, is very sensi­
tive to the presence of even a few outlying observations. For this reason we carry out a form of 
weighted least squares where outlying observations are given less weight in estimating the regres­
sion coefficients (Cleveland, 1993). 
Figure 2: Employment performance and venture capital investment 
(20 OECD countries, average 1986 -1999) 
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As expressed by the regression lines, for each of the venture capital variables the conjectured posi­
tive relationship with respect to employment seems to exist. With the exception of the Netherlands, 
the position of each O~CD economy in the employment/venture capital space seems to be inde­
pendent of the chosen measure for venture capital. The Anglo-Saxon economies are typically lo­
cated in the North-East of the scatter plots, i.e., they are characterized by a high average degree of 
venture capital investment and correspondingly high average employment. In contrast to this, corpo­
ratist countries like Austria, Sweden and Germany are typically located in the South-West (low 
venture capital investment and low employment). Notable exceptions are the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, both are chamcterized by comparably low early stage venture capital investment. 
We start our formal empirical analysis with tests of the non-stationarity of the levels and the first 
differences of the labor-market variables under consideration, i.e., total economy employment and the 
unemployment rate.24 The test we apply here is the first widely used panel data unit root test by 
Levin and Lin (1992).25 This test represents a direct extension ofthe univariate ADF test setting to 
panel data. The results by Levin and Lin indicate that panel data is particularly useful for distin­
guishing between unit roots and highly persistent stationarity in macroeconomic data and that their 
24 The results of unit root tests for all the other time-variant variables investigated in this paper (see Table I) are in prin­

ciple also available on request. However, one should keep in mind that there might be serious problems for their correct 

empirical treatment because of the artificial and constructed character of these institutional variables. Hence, in cases of 

doubt about the order of integration we do not rely too much on the numerical results but stick to economic intuition 

when specifying our regression equations. 

25 This test was augmented by Levin and Lin (1993) and critically s.urveyed by Higgins and Zakrajsek (1999). 
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unit root test for panel data is appropriate in panels of moderate size (between 10 and 250 cross­

sections) as encountered in our study. 

Table 2 (p. 32) displays the results of applying this unit root test to our labor-market data. As usual, 

we difference the data until it is stationary. In cases I to m, this leads us to use the levels of total econ­

omy employment and of the unemployment mte in our estimations. However, the test results from case 

IV (country-specific constants) reveal that the evidence on stationarity of the level of the unemploy­

ment mte is borderline. Moreover, non-stationarity of the level of employment cannot be rejected now 

due to the mther high (in absolute values) critical values of the test-statistics. It is therefore safer to use 

both levels and changes of our labor-market data.26 

2. Pooled Estimation 
2.1 Empirical Model 
Based on our theoretical arguments, we conjecture that controlling for the key institutional variables 
on the labor market, venture capital improves labor-market performance in a cross-country panel 
analysis. To test for a significant relationship between venture capital and labor-market perform­
ance, we undertake first a pooled estimation, second a fixed effects estimation, and third we include" 
institutionallabor-, capital-, and goods-market variables in our pooled estimations. All estimations 
are undertaken both in levels and in differences and for early stage as well as for total venture 
capital investment. 
We start with pooled estimations which assume common coeffiCients for the explanatory variables 
across all cross-section members of our poo1.27 We later on relax this assumption in the robustness 
section and estimate fixed effects models as welL We are aware of the fact that the literature some­
times additionally implements random effects models, mainly because implementing fixed effects 
models and country-dummies are costly in terms of lost degrees of freedom. However, we decided 
to dispense with such a kind of procedure in this paper. The main reason is that random effects 
would in our view only be appropriate if we believed that our sampled cross-sectional units were ­
deviating from our OECD country case - drawn from a large population. Moreover, there is no 
26 A further argument for taking first differences pertains to the venture capital variables. Our unit root tests revealed 
some evidence of a non-stationary behavior of the levels of INVEARL Y and VC. Thus, it is better to additionally 
rely on estimates based on first differences ofthe venture capital variables. 
27 Due to the limited availability of venture capital data with a maximum of 14 annual observations country-specific 
regressions are not (yet) an option. It is furthermore interesting to test whether consistent and reasonable regression 
results hold with respect to the impact of of venture capital on labor markets if one ignores all cross-section specific 
features. By assuming common coefficients one essentially tests whether a common impact of venture capital on 
labor-market performance is valid on average. An empirical non-rejection of this view would point to a similar pat­
tern of endogeneity of labor market developments with respect to factors outside the labor market. These aspects 
along with the obtained greater degrees of freedom motivated us to first do some pooled estimations taking twenty 
OECD countries as cross sectional identifiers. 
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reason to assume the country-specific constants in the (un-) employment equations as random a 
priori according to our theory developed in chapters 2 and 3. 
The empirical model we use can as usual be described as follows: 28 
(14) 
with Yit as the dependent (macroeconomic labor market) variable, Xit and ~i as k-vectors of non­
constant regressors (e.g., venture capital) and parameters for i = 1,2, ... ,N cross-sectional units and 
t = 1,2, ... ,T as the periods for which each cross-section is observed. Imposing Cli = Clj = Cl, a pooled 
analysis with common constants is nested in this specification. 
In order to test for significance of the impact of venture capital on labor-market performance in 
OEeD countries, we separate our analysis into three logical steps. To obtain a benchmark in the 
form of some prima facie evidence, we re-estimate the pioneering study by Wasmer and Wei! 
(2000). However, we base our analysis on a larger sample and explicitly extend it to the impact of 
the availability of venture capital on employment. We furthermore noted that they conduct their 
analysis with levels of the unemployment rate as an endogenous lagged variable. In our view, such a 
kind of procedure is problematic at least due to two reasons. First, unemployment and employment 
time series might at least theoretically be plagued by non-stationarity problems (see section IV.I). 
However, this problem is less severe in light of the fact that the unemployment rate is bounded by 
one from above and by zero from below. Second, the well-known problem of endogenous lagged 
variables in the context of panel analyses (group effects) has to be taken into account. This is usu­
ally done in the literature in a way which as a first step presupposes taking first differences. This is a 
further reason why we conducted our analysis in levels and in first differences. 
In principle, our panel data set can be used to test for dynamic effects as is done in Wasmer and Wei} 
(2000). In order to grasp the speed of adjustment of labor markets, we always include lagged unem­
ployment respectively employment variables in the set of regressors. The corresponding setting with 
respect to a representative regression equation for one cross-section out of the whole system (de­
scribed by the index i) can be described as follows: 
(15) 
28 A dummy for German reunification is included throughout the regressions. Complementary regressions showed 
that the inclusion of a deterministic trend never changed the pattern of our results. 
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However, for estimating our first-order model substantial complications have to be taken into ac­
count. This is the case in both the fixed and in the random effects case and is due to the heterogene­
ity of the cross-sections analyzed (Greene, 2000, 582 ff.). The main problem to be treated here is the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variable (unemployment rate or level of employment) with the 
disturbance, even if the latter does not exhibit autocorrelation itself. 
According to the general approach developed in the literature, taking first differences enables one to 
get rid of heterogeneity, i.e., the group effects, from the model. The problem of the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable and the disturbance still remains. Moreover, a moving­
average error term now appears in the specification. However, the treatment of the resulting model . 
now is a standard application ofthe instrumental variables approach. The transformed model looks 
as follows: 
(16) 

Arellano (1989) and Greene (2000) for instance recommend using the differences or 
the lagged levels as instrumental variables for in order to derive a 
~--------------~ ~------------~ 
simple instrumental variable estimator. The remaining variables can be taken as their own instru­
ments. Arellano (1989) gives some theoretical and empirical support in favor of preferring levels to 
differences as instruments. As our second step of analysis, we therefore implement this procedure. 
As a third step, we conduct robustness tests by also including variables representing labor-, capital-, 
and goods market institutions. 
2.2 Estimation procedure 
Throughout the paper and following Wasmer and Weil (2000), we rely on FGLS estimates of a 
model assuming the presence of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation but without 
correction for contemporaneous correlation.29 Motivated by inspections of the country-specific 
29 See Greene (2000, 592). One might argue that uncorrelatedness across our cross-sectional units (countries) is a too 
strong asswnption because our model assigns the same parameter vector to all units in the common coefficients case, 
in which FGLS (SUR) estimates of a model with heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation would be suit­
able. However, in view of the fact that correlations across sectors become relevant mainly in the case of symmetric 
• ]8­
residuals we include an AR error term in our specification which enables us to get rid of autocorre­
lation problems in the time dimension. Following Greene (2000, 605), we prefer to impose the 
restriction of a common autocorrelation coefficient across countries. 
The sample has been chosen to be a maximum of 1986 to 1999 in order to exploit all available 
information. The structure for presenting the estimation results is the same throughout all tables with 
the exact specifications of the pooled estimation equations being described in the tables themselves. 
All specifications include an endogenous lagged labor-market variable, contemporaneous real GDP 
growth with or without its lagged value as cyclical control, one venture capital indicator (contempo­
raneous odagged or both) and a constant (in cases where institutions do not replace the constant).30 
Note that the number of observations in each case depends on the variables included and on their 
lags. Following Wasmer and Weil (2000) the fit of each equation is checked by referring to the R­
squared, the F-statistics and the Durbin-Watson time series test for autocorrelation of residuals.31 
Since the marginal significance level of the F-test ofjoint significance of all of the slope coefficients 
is in all cases clearly below one percent, the p-value is not explicitly tabulated by us throughout the 
tables. However, the degrees of freedom can be easily read of from the tables.32 
2.3 Results 

The results for our pooled regressions are given in Tables 3a to 4b, with Tables 3a and 3b (4a and 

4b) denoting the estimated impact of venture capital on the level (first differences) of standardized 

unemployment rates and employment respectively. Hence, Tables 3a and 3b correspond to equation 

(15) for levels, while Tables 4a and 4b correspond to equation (16) for first differences. In all tables, 

the coefficient estimate (the values in brackets correspond to the empirical t-values), the R-squared 

and the empirical realization of the F-statistics are displayed for a given specification (specifications 

range from (l) to (12». The bold numbers denote coefficient estimates of the venture capital vari­

ables which are significant at least at the ten percent level. 

Table 3: FGLS estimates of a model in levels with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorre­

lation (20 OECD countries, common coefficients)33-see pp. 33-34. 

shocks to the labor markets and the probability of the latter is small in our large OECD sample (see the debate on 

optimum currency areas), we refrain from considering this case and from applying SUR. An additional reason is 

comparability with the Wasmer and Weil (2000) study. 

JO The inclusion ofa cyclical control variable can itself be interpreted as a first robustness test. 

31 However, some caveats with respect to the application of the DW-statistics have to be raised. The use of the DW 

is critical not only in cases of endogenous lagged variables. but its application in panels is also in general problem­

atic. Our estimations showed that the DW changed its empirical realization depending on the ordering of the cross­

section identifiers. However, as Wasmer and Wei! (2000), we are unaware of other easily available tests for panels. 

and the DW indicates for our panel that we would in nearly all cases not be able to reject the null hypothesis ofno 

autocorrelation. . 

32 The numerator degrees of freedom can be calculated as the number of explaining variables less one and the de­

nominator degrees of freedom corresponds to the numbers ofobservations minus the number of regressors. 

33 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­

theses, common constants assumed. Early stage venture capital investment startup and seed investment. Venture 
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.) Impact of venture capital investment on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control) 
Impact ofventure capital investment on employment (with cyclical control) 
Table 4: FGLS estimates of a model in differences with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (20 OECD countries, common coefficients)--see pp. 35-36 . 
.) Impact ofthe delivery ofventure capital on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control)34 
I) Impact of the delivery of venture capital on employment (with cyclical control)35 
According to the realization of the selected weighted statistics, the hypothesis of an incorrect speci­
fication has to be rejected. There appears a bulk of significant estimates of the impact of venture 
capital on the labor market, all with the theoretically expected sign. As a first step, it appears to be 
useful to take a look at the empirical realizations of the t-values for the venture capita! coefficient 
estimates. In Tables 3a and 3b, we find a total of21 out of potential 32 significant relationships with 
t-values up to 3.64 in the case of specification (9) in Table 4b. In Tables 4a and 4b, we are still able 
to identify 13 significant relationships. Thus, evidence in favor ofour main hypothesis is to a certain 
extent 'Veaker in the case of first differences than in the cases of levels. Second, a certain clustering 
of significant results with the expected sign can above all be observed within Tables 3b and 4b, i.e., 
the significance of our measures for veriture capital is more pronounced in the employment equa­
tions than in the unemployment equations. 
Concerning the significance of lagged versus contemporaneous impacts, in the case of estimates in 
levels the early investment variable (INVEARL Y) is more significant if it is lagged whereas the 
more comprehensive measure VC reaches the highest t-values if it is specified contemporaneously. 
However, the corresponding pattern of results is less clear in our estimations in first differences 
(Tables 4a and 4b).36 Early investment now enters contemporaneously while the VC variable is 
capital investment = startup, seed and expansion investment. ./../... denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent 
level. 
34 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­
theses, common constants assumed. Early stage venture capital investment = startup and seed investment. Venture 
capital investment = startup, seed and expansion investment. ./••/••• denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent 
level. The term in eq. (16) is instrumented by the change in the unemployment rate lagged two 
rsriods. 
5 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­
theses, common constants assumed. ·/··1·" denotes significance at the 10/511 percent level. The term 
in eq. (16) is instrumented by the level of employment lagged two periods and the level of em­
'-:----:--~~ 
f10yment lagged three periods. 
Note that our estimations in first differences are still characterized by relatively large R-squareds. 
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more significant if it is lagged. The existence of a time-to-build period between investment and an 
improvement of the labor market stance, as proposed by Wasmer and Weil (2000), is therefore not 
supported unambiguously by our results. In sum, Tables 3a to 4b yield prima facie empirical sup­
port for our hypothesis that venture capital improves labor-market performance. 
3. Are the pooled estimation results robust? 

In order to avoid an omitted-variable bias we conduct several tests for robustness, each considering 

different aspects and including additional explaining variables. Note that our specifications in 

Tables 3a to 4b already contained an implicit robustness test since real GDP growth was included in 

the set of regressors. 

3.1 Fixed effects estimation 

First, we give up the assumption of common coefficients and turn to estimations of exactly the same 

specifications as in Tables 3a to 4b, but this time assuming different intercepts for the individual 

OECD economies. In other words, we use alternative specifications of the constant in the pooled 

regression estimation. By this, we dispense with our initial assumption of identical intercepts for all 

pool members. Here we consider a case of fixed effects, i.e., specific (and possibly different) inter­

cepts for each OECD country as a pool member. Tables Sa to 6b display the corresponding estima­

tion results: 

Table S: FGLS estimates of a model in levels with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorre­

lation (20 OECD countries, cross-section specific constants)37 -see pp. 37-38. 

a) Impact ofventure capital investment on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control) 
b) Impact ofventure capital investment on employment (with cyclical control) 
The pattern of the results in Tables Sa and Sb for the levels of unemployment and employment 
resembles closely those in Tables 3a and 3b. However, coefficient estimates come out to be a bit 
smaller in magnitude and sometimes less significant than under the assumption of common coeffi­
cients. Tables 6a and 6b display the corresponding estimation results for our first difference specifi­
cations: 
Table 6: FGLS estimates of a model in differences with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (20 OECD countries, cross-section specific constants)-see pp. 39-40. 
a) Impact of the delivery ofventure capital on the unemployment rate (with cyclical 
controllS 
31 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­
theses, common constants assumed. Early stage venture capital investment startup and seed investment. Venture 
capital investment == startup. seed and expansion investment. Cross-section specific constants assumed (fixed-effects 
model). *,..,*.. denotes significance at the 10/511 percent level. • 
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I) Impact of the delivery of venture capital on the level of employment (with cyclical 
controli9 

With respect to changes in the unemployment rate, now 9 instead of 4 entries (Table 6a versus 4a) in 

the venture capital table rows are significant with the expected sign. At the same time, the magni­

tude of the estimated venture capital coefficients increases slightly. In contrast to this, the number of 

significant entries with the correct sign falls from 9 to 5 for the specifications for the first differ­

ences of employment (Table 6b versus 4b). Correspondingly, the magnitude of the estimated in­

vestment coefficient decreases in most cases. Overall, the VC variable seems to be more significant 

than the INVEARL Y variable. 

3.2 Including other institutional variables 
As a second and most important robustness test for the impact of venture capital on labor-market 
performance across countries, we now include institutional labor-, capital-, and goods-market 
variables.4o Like, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and Nickell (1997), we include these variables 
separately (not displayed here, available on request) and jointly. Our main intention is to investigate 
whether the detected impact of venture capital on labor-market performance is robust to including a 
large set of standard institutional variables and whether it changes the impact of the traditional 
labor-market variables on labor-market performance. 
The following Tables 7 to 10 display estimation results based on empirical models which have been 
selected from Tables 3 and 4 and have been augmented by all indicators of capital-. labor-. and 
goods-market institutions listed in Table 1. Our tabulated preferred specifications result from a 
general-to-specific testing-down procedure by means of sequential tests for significance of individ­
ual or of a group of regressors. The realizations of the R-squared is tabulated as well. The models 
have been simplified in the usual stepwise fashion by eliminating insignificant variables or variable 
31 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­

theses. Early stage venture capital investment = startup and seed investment. Venture capital investment = startup, 

seed and expansion investment. Cross-section specific constants assumed (fixed-effects model). Instruments rely on 

the same specification as in Table 4a. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 

39 Dummy DUMGER (=0 for 1986 to 1990, =1 from 1991 to 1999) for reunification included; t-statistics in paren­
theses; cross-section specific constants assumed (fixed-effects model). The term in eq. (16) is in­

strumented by the change in employment lagged two periods. */**/* .. denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent 

level. 

40 As a further robustness test, we tested for robustness with respect to a change in the membership of the pool. i.e.• 

we confined ourselves to those thirteen EU countries included in our OECD sample. The large share oftheoreticaJly 

correct signs of the coefficient estimates of the venture capital impact on the labor market was again striking. Hence, 

the effect identified in this paper appears to be robust with respect to the selected OECD subsample. Corresponding 

estimates for the models in first differences (along the lines of Tables 4a and 4b) led to rather similar results. The 

results are available on request. 

- 22­
groups until a parsimonious adaption to the data generating process was reached. The lag number of 
lagged endogenous variables (one or more) is determined by this procedure as well. 
The tables include the coefficient estimates for the selected venture capital variable (the empirical t­
value of the coefficient estimate of this variable being the selection criterion), the cyclical control 
variable and (some of) the additional institutional variables from Table I together with the respec­
tive realizations of the t-statistics and the corresponding measures of the fit for each of the robust­
ness test specifications. In our preferred specifications for the first differences of the labor-market 
variables, we do not always include a constant. In this respect, we closely follow the specification 
proposed by the transformation in eq. (16). In economic terms, we allow the institutional variables 
to substitute the constant in cases where at least one institutional variable is time-invariant.41 
We start with displaying the estimations for levels of the unemployment rate (Table 7) and employ­
ment (Table 8) to be followed by estimations of selected models in first differences for the same 
variables (Tables 9 and 10). In each case, we consider a model without any venture capital variable 
(a), another model with the best fitting early investment variable (b), and finally a model with the 
best fitting overall venture capital investment variable (c). Our preferred specifications are: 
• specifications (2) and (7) in Table 3a for the level of the unemployment rate (Table 7), 
• specifications (2) and (7) in Table 3b for the level of employment (Table 8), 
• specifications (1) and (7) in Table 4a for the difference of the unemployment rate (Table 9), 
and 
• specifications (1) and (8) in Table 4b for the difference ofemployment (Table 10). 
Table 7: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the level of unemployment augmented by indicators 
of the capital, labor and product market setting42--see p. 41. 
With respect to the models for the level of the unemployment rate (Tables 7a to 7c), a certain set of 
the additional institutional variables remains significant after passing the general-to-specific proce­
dure. In the absence of any venture capital variable (Table 7a), the benefit duration, the employer 
coordination index, the employment protection index, the tax wedge, and union density (as institu­
tionallabor market variables) as well as the variables for shareholder and creditor rights turn out to 
be significant in most cases at the one percent significance level, the tax wedge being the only 
exception (significant at the five percent level). Moreover, the corresponding coefficient estimates 
display the right sign except for the shareholder rights indicator. If venture capital investment is 
added (Tables 7b and 7c), the results become even more pronounced. Even the tax wedge is now 
41 The constant or the coefficient of the institutional variables in our (un-) employment equations determine the level 

of equilibrium (un-)employment). Another point is worthwhile to be mentioned here. Our institutional variables for 

the replacement rate (RRA TE, RRI and RR25) might appear to be highly correlated at first glance. However, as Ta­

ble I shows RRATE is much less variable over time than RRI and RR25. In addition, RRI and RR25 differ strongly 

with respect to the time span they relate to. 

42 t-statistics in parentheses, ·1··1·" denotes significance at the 10/511 percent level. 
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significant at the one percent level with the correct sign. If the more comprehensive venture capital 
measure VC is implemented (Table 7c), the index of shareholder rights is replaced by the barrier to 
entrepreneurship variable. However, the coefficient estimate for the latter variable reveals the 
theoretically wrong sign. It is interesting to note that active labor market programs and the replace­
ment ratio (although three variants of the latter have been tested) are insignificant throughout the 
specifications in Tables 7a to 7C.43 Finally and most important in our context, the venture capital 
variables remain highly significant. Let us now turn to the results for the level of employment: 
Table 8: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the level of employment augmented by indicators of 
the capital, labor and product market setting44 --see p. 42. 
With respect to the models for the level of employment (Tables 8a to 8c) and compared with Tables 
7a to 7c, a somewhat different set of institutional variables turns out to be significant. In the absence 
of any venture capital variable (Table 8a), the replacement rate (two variants), the overall coordina­
tion index, the employment protection index (as institutional labor market variables) are now sig­
nificant. The employment protection index according to Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) which is 
highly variable over time now replaces the less time variant Layard and Nickell employment pro­
tection index. Again, the corresponding coefficient estimates display the right sign except for the 
indicators for shareholder rights, employer coordination, and the Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) 
replacement rate RRI. If venture capital investment is added (Tables 8b and 8c), the results remain 
more or less the same. If the less comprehensive venture capital measure INVEARL Y is imple­
mented (Table 8b), an additional version of the replacement rate (RR25) is included. However, the 
coefficient estimate for the latter variable reveals the theoretically wrong sign. Moreover, the coor­
dination variables and the employment protection index barely miss significance at the ten percent 
level but still are jointly significant (corresponding F-tests are available on request). Creditor rights 
are the only capital-market institution which displays significance and the correct sign throughout 
Tables 8a to 8c. Finally, our venture capital variables again turn out to be highly significant, this 
time even at the one percent level. We now turn to our final specifications in differences: 
Table 9: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the first difference of unemployment augmented by 
indicators of the capital, labor and product market setting4S--see p. 43. 
With respect to the models for the changes in the unemployment rate (Tables 9a to 9c), the set of 
significant additional institutional variables can be characterized as follows. In the absence of any 
venture capital variable (Table 9a), two versions of the replacement rate, the benefit duration, the 
Blanchard and Wolfers employment protection index, union density (as institutional labor market 
variables) and the creditor rights variable turn out to be significant in most cases at the one or five 
43 In fact, active labor market programs are insignificant throughout all our specifications. 

44 t-statistics in parentheses, ·1••1.·· denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 

4S t-statistics in parentheses, .1··1••• denotes significance at the 10/511 percent level. 

·24· 
percent significance leveL The Layard and Nickell replacement rate is the only exception (signifi­
cance at the ten percent level slightly missed but jointly significant with the other variables46). 
Moreover, the corresponding coefficient estimates display the right sign except for the Blanchard 
and Wolfers replacement rate. If the change in venture capital investment is added (Tables 9b and 
9c), the pattern of the results is the same as before. Most important in our context, the venture 
capital variable VC in contrast to the less comprehensive measure INVEARL Y turns out to be 
significant at the five percent level. Finally, we interpret the results gained for the first differences of 
employment: 
Table 10: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the first difference of employment augmented by 
indicators of the capital, labor and product market setting47--see p. 44. 
In the panel regressions for the changes in employment (Tables lOa to I Oc), the largest set of addi­
tional institutional variables becomes significant after passing the general-to-specific procedure. In 
the absence of any venture capital variable (Table lOa), both Blanchard and Wolfers replacement 
rates, the benefit duration, the union coverage index (which has not appeared in any table up to 
now), the employer coordination index, the Blanchard and Wolfers employment protection index, 
the product market regulation index and the variables for shareholder and creditor rights tum out to 
be significant in most cases at the one percent significance level. Moreover, the corresponding 
coefficient estimates display the expected sign except for the replacement rate, the employer coordi­
nation index, and the goods-market regulation indicator. This time, even the indicator for share­
holder rights displays the correct sign. If venture capital investment is added (Tables lOb and IOc), 
the results stay as pronounced as before. If the more comprehensive venture capital measure VC is 
implemented (Table 9c), the tax wedge is now significant at the ten percent level with the correct 
sign. As in nearly all models in Tables 8 to I 0 b~fore, the venture capital variables again tum out to 
be highly significant.4s To sum up, based on our empirical evidence we can clearly reject the null 
hypothesis that the early investment venture capital variable and the standard venture capital vari­
able including expansion investment do not improve labor-market performance. 
In order to quantify the positive effects of venture capital on labor-market performance, it is useful 
to calculate the short-run and the long-run impact of a permanent positive one standard deviation 
shock in our two venture capital variables on OECD labor markets.49 Starting from the realization of 
our venture capital time series in the year 1999, a one standard deviation shock in the availability of 
46 Note also that econometric theory in such a case recommends to implement a regressor if its t-value realization is 

still above one (minus one). 

41 t-statistics in parentheses, ·1**1··· denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 

41 An implication of our results with respect to the dynamic behavior of the labor market should also be noted. Siilce 

regression equations in Tables 9 and 10 are specified in first differences, significant institutional variables explain in 

principle the increase respectively decrease of our labor market series over time whereas in Tables 7 and 8 institu­

tional variables in a strict sense contribute to explaining the level ofequilibrium (un-)employment. 
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venture capital means an increase of the VC variable by 0.35 percent and an increase of the IN­
VEARL Y variable by 0.38 percent. For, e.g., Germany such a shock would imply an increase of 
seed, startup and expansion investment by 0.46 per mil of GOP and an increase of seed and startup 
investment by 0.17 per mil of GOP. Based on our panel estimations, Table 11 shows that such an 
increase in the availability of venture capital reduces the unemployment rate in the short run by 0.14 
percentage points and in the long run by 1.13 percentage points. Columns 2 and 3 display the analo­
gous positive impact on employment. 
Table II: Oynamic labor-market impacts of venture capital investment-see p. 45. 
If labor supply were constant, the short-term and the long-term coefficients for unemployment and 
employment should be approximately equal in absolute value and of opposite sign. However, this is 
definitely not valid in our example. On the one hand, the impact coefficient for unemployment is 
relatively smaller than that for employment, with non-overlapping bounds if one uses the usual 
standard error limit. On the other hand the long-term impact of venture capital on employment 
seems to be actually greater than the one on unemployment. This suggests that labor supply itself 
might be affected by the availability of venture capital in the short term, i.e., increasing when avail­
ability goes up, which would be consistent with our general approach considering that the decision 
to enter the labor market involves sunk costs. 
V. Conclusions 
Aggregate unemployment results from insufficient job creation and excessive job destruction. Both 
are inherently linked to investments and to the founding of new firms and thus to the functioning of 
capital markets. Institutional structures on capital markets which help to alleviate financial con­
straints in entrepreneurial decision-making should therefore boost employment. The great variance 
in venture capital markets across OECO-countries and the fact that continental Europe lags behind 
in this respect compared to the Anglo-Saxon countries indicates that capital-market imperfections 
might help standard labor-market variables in explaining differences in labor-market performances 
across countries. It is by now well established that flexible labor markets improve aggregate em­
ployment performance. However, by leaving out capital-market variables, past empirical results 
might have missed other important institutional factors and might have overstated the impact and 
significance of some of the labor-market variables due to an omitted variable bias. 
Our empirical analysis based on panel data for 20 OECO countries from 1986 to 1999 confirms this 
conjecture. Both, overall venture capital investments and early stage venture capital investments in 
relation to GOP improve significantly labor-market performance. These effects are present in a wide 
array of different econometric specifications and they are in particular still prevalent when standard 
49 The long-run equilibrium effect is calculated by dividing the short-run impact effect by one minus the coefficients 
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institutional variables describing labor-, capital., and goods-market regulations are included in the 
panel regressions. 
Our results with respect to certain controversial labor-market variables are worth noting. First, 
active labor market policies are insignificant throughout our specifications. Hence, our results shed 
some doubt on the view that active labor market policies are a panacea in fighting unemployment. 
Second, there has been some controversy in recent years over how employment protection affects 
the situation on the labor market. Our results are clear·cut in this respect, employment protection 
raises unemployment and hampers employment throughout our specifications. Third, it is often 
argued that coordination and thus centralization of wage bargaining is good for labor-market per­
formance when controlling for union strength. Our results are ambiguous in this respect. In those 
cases where they are significant, our coordination variables exercise a negative impact upon both, 
unemployment and employment. Hence, coordinating wage bargaining is not necessarily a good 
idea for achieving higher employment but might have helped in the past to keep official unemploy­
ment rates low. 
Concerning recommendations for economic policy, our results suggest the following. Structural 
reforms of labor markets, especially concerning unemployment benefit systems and employment 
protection legislation should stay up high on the political agenda in continental Europe. However, 
the positive effect upon employment growth will be greater if such labor-market reforms are ac­
companied by improvements of the institutional set-up on capital markets, in particular concerning 
venture capital. Venture capital markets have grown substantially in continental Europe in recent 
years partially due to the improved possibilities for initial public offerings. While this should help to 
foster employment growth in the upcoming years, there is still considerable scope for institutional 
improvements. Jeng and Wells (2000) find that pension funds and flexible labor markets themselves 
are two other important institutional prerequisites for well-functioning venture capital markets. 
Hence, moving from a pay-as-you-go to a more funded pension system with real pension funds 
might help in further developing venture capital markets. Making labor markets more flexible is also 
conducive to fighting unemployment indirectly via boosting venture capital markets. Yet, politico­
economic considerations suggest that the institutional structures on both markets are linked by 
politico-economic forces (Fehn and Meier, 2000). Hence, only comprehensive reforms exploiting 
such politico-economic complementarities are likely to succeed. 
ofthe lagged endogenous variables. 
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Ad I) test equations correspond to model 1 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.39/-1.76/-2.45 

(Levin and Lin (1992), Table I, p. 45 (for N=20 cross-sections and t=1O periods). 

Ad II) test equations correspond to model 2 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.57/-1.94/-2.64 

(Levin and Lin (1992), Table 2, p. 46 (for N'"'20 cross-sections and t'"'l0 periods). 

Ad III) test equations correspond to model 3 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1. 75/-2.13/-2.S5 

(Levin and Lin (1992), Table 3, p. 47 (for N=20 cross-sections and t=1O periods). 

Ad IV) test equations correspond to modelS in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -6.82/-7.06/-7.51 

(Levin and Lin (1992), Table 5, p. 49 (for N=20 cross-sections and t=1O periods). 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (S) (9) (10) (II) (12) 
Unemployment rate (-1) 0.95 
(37.44) 
0.96 
(42.58) 
0.96 
(42.61) 
0.92 
(31.68) 
0.93 
(34.72) 
0.93 
(32.50) 
0.95 
(36.41) 
0.96 
(40.11) 
0.96 
(40.76» 
0.92 0.93 
(31.17) (33.73) 
0.93 
(32.S7) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.24 
(-9.73) 
-0.24 
(-9.85) 
-0.23 
(-9.73) 
-0.24 
(-10.34) 
-0.24 
(-10.55) 
-0.24 
(-10.30) 
-0.24 
(-9.67» 
-0.24 
(-9.90) 
-0.23 
(-9.68» 
-0.24 -0.24 
(-10.33) (-10.73) 
-0.24 
(-10.24) 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I -0.20 
(-8.89) 
-0.20 
(-8.62) 
-0.20 
(-8.49) 
I I I -0.20 -0.20 
(-S.71) (-8.S5) 
-0.19 
(-S.21) 
Early stage 
venture capital investment 
-0.48** 
(-2.40) 
I -0.08 
(-0.29) 
-0.24 
(-1.49) 
I -0.33* 
(-1.60) 
I I I I I I 
Early stage. 
venture capital investment (-1) 
I -1.01*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.91* 
(-1.88) 
I -0.19 
(-0.60) 
0.26 
(0.65) 
I I I I I I 
Venture capital investment I I I I I I -0.24*** 
(-2.82) 
I -0.25*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.12* I 
(-1.73) 
-0.12* 
(-1.56) 
Venture capital investment (-1) I I I I I I I -0.22* 
(-1.67) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
I -0.06 
(-0.50) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
Constant 0.47 
(1.99) 
0.40 
(1.81) 
0.37 
(1.67) 
1.33 
(4.70) 
1.23 
(4.56) 
1.21 
(4.26) 
0.56 
(2.27) 
0.46 
(1.93) 
0.44 
(I.S7) 
1.38 1.27 
(4.78) . (4.51) 
1.23 
(4.23) 
Weighted statistics 
If 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
F-statistics 2155.4 2230.679 1775.742 2389.399 2227.008 1984.933 2164.209 2067.793 1704.577 2390.667 2258.914 1913.595 
Durbin -Watson 1.84 1.83 1.93 1.87 1.82 1.80 1.82 1.83 I.S2 1.87 I.S2 LSI 
Total ptClnel observations 
~-...... --...... --...... -
-
207 
~-
205 202 194 
-
192 189 207 205 202 194 192 
-­
IS9 
c. 
Table 3: FGLS estimates of a model in levels with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (20 OECD countries, common coefficients) 
) Impact ofventure capital investment on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control) 
J 
w 
w 
I 
b) Impact of venture capital investment on employment (with cyclical control) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Employment (-J ) 0.88 
(14.81) 
0.89 
(15.97) 
0.90 
(16.40) 
0.89 
(2.79) 
0.91 
(26.62) 
0.91 
(23.67) 
0.88 
(11.46) 
0.88 
(12.84) 
0.85 
(11.41) 
0.89 
(23.92) 
0.91 
(24.39) 
0.89 
(2.31) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.27 
(7.18) 
0.26 
(15.97) 
0.27 
(7.55) 
0.36 
(9.59) 
0.36 
(9.72) 
0.35 
(9.20) 
0.26 
(6.94) 
0.25 
(6.93) 
0.25 
(6.82) 
0.37 
(9.86) 
0.36 
(9.58) 
0.34 
(8.95) 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I 0.35 
(9.29) 
0.32 
(8.46) 
0.32 
(8.22) 
I I I 0.34 
(9.34) 
0.33 
(8.63) 
0.31 
(8.16) I 
Early stage 
venture capital investment 
1.09*** 
(3.10) 
I 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.68** 
(2.30) 
I 0.51 
(1.38) 
I I I I I I 
Early stage 
venture capital investment (.1) 
I 2.77*** 
(3.87) 
2.76*** 
(3.12) 
I 1.13* 
(1.86) 
0.59 
(0.76) 
I I I I I I 
Venture capital investment I I I I I I 0.56*** 
(3.51) 
I 0.47*** 
(2.78) 
0.39*** 
(2.78) 
I 0.37** 
(2.41) 
Venture capital investment (­
1) 
I I I I I I I 0.78*** 
(2.91) 
0.60** 
(2.11) 
I 0.39* 
(1.64) 
0.28 
(1.06) 
Constant 12.62 
(2.10) 
11.54 
(2.04» 
10.96 
(1.99) 
9.85 
(2.79) 
8.16 
(2.38) 
8.68 
(2.26) 
12.37 
(1.58) 
13.00 
(1.85) 
15.76 
(2.08) 
10.15 
(2.72) 
8.78 
(2.37) 
10.19 
(2.31) 
Weighted statistics 
If 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
F-statistics 94951.83 138415.3 115359 166187 162894 . 136788.8 96402.12 111440.6 91469.66 204039.7 143270.4 147085.4 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 2.01 2.05 1.98 2.06 2.03 1.93 2.04 2.03 1.99 2.05 2.04 
Total panel observations 216 214 211 202 200 197 216 214 211 202 ·200 197 
I 
-d' 
M 
I 
Table 4: FGLS estimates of a model in differences with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (20 OECD countries, common coefficients) 
) Impact of the delivery of venture capital on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control) 
I 
I 
I 
\.oJ 
VI 
I 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Instrument for the change in the 
unemployment rate (-1) 
-0.13 
(-l.81) 
-0.15 
(-2.09) 
-0.14 
(-2.03) 
-0.10 
(-1.87) 
-0.11 
(-2.06) 
-0.11 
(-2.06) 
-0.14 
(-2.03) 
-0.14 
( -2.03) 
-0.15 
(-2.21) 
-0.10 
( -1.93) 
-0.11 
( -2.07) 
-0.11 
(-2.13) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.27 
(-10.73) 
-0.26 
(-10.74) 
-0.26 
(-10.29) 
~0.24 
(-10.24) 
-0.24 
(-10.04) 
-0.24 
(-9.82) 
-0.26 
( -10.98) 
-0.27 
(-10.90) 
-0.26 
(-10.87) 
-0.24 
(-10.07) 
-0.24 
(-10.16) 
-0.24 
(-9.84) 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I -0.20 
(-8.77) 
-0.20 
(-8.66) 
-0.20 
(-8.32) 
I I I -0.20 
(-8.52) 
-0.20 
-8.60) 
-0.19 
(-7.88) 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment 
-0.36 
(-1.39) 
I -0.46* 
(-1.72) 
-0.23 
(-LlO) 
I -0.17 
(-0.83) 
I I I I I I 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment (-1) 
I -0.29 
(-0.73) 
-0.37 
(-0.97) 
I -0.05 
(-0.13) 
-0.06 
( -0.18) 
I I I I I I 
Change in 
vent:ure capital investment 
I I I I I I -0.26*** 
(-2.62) 
I -0.37*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.07 
(-0.89) 
I -0.09 
(-1.03) 
Change in 
vent:ure capital investment (·1) 
I I I I I I I -0.16 
(-1.20) 
.0.30** 
(-2.35) 
I -0.04 
(-0.41) 
-0.08 
(-0.72) 
0.94 
(8.99) 
Constant 0.54 
5.38) 
0.55 
(5.49) 
0.57 
(5.59) 
0.94 
(9.29) 
0.93 
(8.90) 
0.95 
(9.02) 
0.55 
(5.55) 
0.56 
(5.67) 
0.60 
(6.15) 
0.92 
(9.16) 
0.93 
(8.92) 
Weighted statistics 
R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.71 
F -st"atistics 58.30 57.10 46.27 74.38 69.05 58.72 63.40 57.23 51.85 72.51 68.72 57.29 
.­
1.86 
.._­
168 
Durbin-Watson 1.83 1.82 1.84 1.85 1.89 1.87 1.84 1.81 1.78 1.86 1.89 
Total panel observations 174 172 169 173 171 168 174 172 169 173 171 
b) Impact or the delivery or venture capital on employment (with cyclical control) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Instrument for the change in 
employment (-1 ) 
-0.14 
(-2.23) 
-0.16 
(-2.67) 
-0.13 
(-2.10) 
-0.12 
(-2.72) 
-0.12 
(-2.64) 
-0.12 
(-2.63) 
-0.14 
(-2.33) 
-0.16 
(-2.76) 
-0.14 
(-2.44) 
-0.13 
(-2.79) 
-0.12 
(-2.64) 
-0.12 
(-2.54) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.34 
(7.71) 
0.38 
(8.53) 
0.34 
(7.55) 
0.38 
(9.50) 
0.40 
(10.13) 
0.39 
(9.57) 
0.34 
(7.76) 
0.40 
(8.90) 
0.34 
(7.71) 
0.38 
(9.57) 
0.39 
(10.03) 
0.38 
(9.33) 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I 0.32 
(8.30) 
0.33 
(8.44) 
0.32 
(7.96) 
I I I 0.32 
(8.22) 
0.31 
(8.10) 
0.30 
(7.32) 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment 
0.93** 
(2.19) 
I 0.94** 
(2.22) 
0.26 
(0.77) 
I 0.24 
(0.69) 
I I I I I I 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment (-I) 
I 1.31* 
(1.56) 
0.85 
(LlO) 
I -0.14 
(-0.20) 
-0.28 
(-0.38) 
I I I I I I 
Change in 
venture capital investment 
I I I I I I 0.37** 
(2.16) 
I 0.55*** 
(3.05) 
0.07 
(0.52) 
I 0.19 
(1.26) 
Change in 
venture capital investment (-1) 
I I I I I I I 0.73*** 
(2.91) 
0.86·*· 
(3.64) 
I 0.37* 
(1.81) 
0.47** 
(2.23) 
Constant 17.98 
(5.22) 
14.55 
(4.76) 
18.53 
(5.08) 
11.04 
(4.42) 
10.78 
(4.24) 
11.32 
(4.06) 
17.09 
(5.07) 
14.76 
(5.11) 
19.56 
(5.65) 
10.90 
(4.40) 
11.37 
(4.43) 
12.37 
(4.23) 
Weighted statistics 
If 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.78 0.78 0.77 
F-slatistics 50.26 51.15 40.31 85.15 83.89 70.42 49.99 54.06 46.84 86.33 84.77 71.29 
Durbin-Watson 1.96 1.92 1.93 1.94 1.94 1.93 1.99 1.91 1.89 1.96 1.91 1.90 
Total panel observations 
'---­ -
183 
L. 
181 
-
178 
-
182 180 
'--- .. .... ........ _._._ _ 
177 183 181 178 
-
182 180 177 
_.. _.... _ .. _.... ­
J I 
C""\ 

I 

'  
Table 5: FGLS estimates of a model in levels with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (20 OEeD countries, cross-section specific constants) 
a) Impact of venture capital investment on the unemployment rate (with cyclical control) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11 ) (12) 
Unemployment rate (-1) 1.32 1.32 1.32 1.21 1.20 1.22 1.31 1.33 1.31 1.21 1.20 1.22 
(32.77) (30.68) (30.52) (24.25) (22.59) (23.14) (32.58) (31.00) (30.83) (24.48) (22.92) (23.66) 
Unemployment rate (-2) -0.53 -0.53 -0.54 -0.43 -0.41 -0.43 -0.53 -0.54 -0.54 -0.43 -0.41 -0.44 
( -12.93) (-12.12) (-12.18) ( -8.35) (-7.57) (-8.07) (-13.04) (-12.47) (-12.58) ( -8.48) (-7.75) (-8.37) 
I Real GDP growth rate -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
~ (-10.24) (-9.89) (-9.97) (-9.20) (-8.82) (-8.89) (-10.09) (-10.27) (-9.77) (-9.18) (-9.15) (-8.84) 
I 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 I I I -0.09 -0.12 -0.10 
(-3.67) (-4.30) ( -3.53) ( -3.54) (-4.48) ( -3.45) 
Earlystnge -0.30·· I -0.20 -0.20 I -0.17 I I I I I I 
venture eapital investment (-2.04) (-0.87) (-1.45) (-0.74) 
Early stnge I -0.54·· -0.23 I -0.37 -0.10 I I I I I I 
venture eapital investment (-I) (-1.96) (-0.53) (-1.39) (-0.24) 
Venture capital investment I I I I I I -0.18·" I -0.22··· -0.13"'''' I -O.IS" 
(-2.81) (-2.61) (-2.04) (-2.20) 
Venture capital investment (-I) I I I I I I I -0.15 0.10 I -0.07 0.13 
( -1.34) (0.71) (-0.69) (0.96) 
Wei'l.ht~ s.tatistics 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
F-statistics 4200.902 4103.836 3165.712 3479.801 3275.495 2687.003 4499.029 4359.116 3506.369 3754.931 3647.535 3092.689 
Durbin- Watson 2.07 2.06 2.08 1.94 1.91 1.95 2.05 2.08 2.04 1.93 1.92 1.92 
Total panel observations 213 211 208 212 210 207 213 211 208 212 210 207 
-_._....... _­
-
b) Impact of venture capital investment on employment (witb cyclical control) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (S) (9) 
Employment (-1) 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.24 1.21 1.25 1.39 1.40 1.38 
(32.11) (29.93) (29.74) (23.90) (22.83) (23.52) (32.02) (30.00) (29.63) 
Employment (-2) -0.48 -0.47 -0.48 -0.33 -0.30 -0.34 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 
(-11.03) (-10.80) (-1O.67)} (-6.15) (-5.53) (-6.31) (-IU2) (-10.76) (-10.71) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.40 
(10.88) 00.68) (10.39) «9.49) (9.55) (9.18) (11.01) (11.48) (10.55) 
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I 0.25 0.30 0.25 I I I 
(5.34) (6.51) (5.26) 
Early stage 0.99*** I 0.62 0.67** I 0.59 I I I 
venture capital investment (3.13) (1.31) (2.16) (1.26) 
Early stage I 1.84*** 1.07 I 1.06** 0.35 I I I 
venture capital investment (3.35) (1.29) (1.93) (0.43) 
(-1) 
Venture capital investment I I I I I I 0.51*** I 0.46*** 
(3.63) (2.49) 
Venture capital investment I I I I I I I 0.52** 0.18 
(-1) (2.26) (0.59) 
Weir:.hted stati.s.lig R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
F -statistics 242049.8 244507.1 181218.1 180275.6 147010.9 136695.1 239720.0 203136.1 168308.8 
Durbin-Watson 2.18 2.17 2.18 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.20 2.20 2.20 
Total panel observations 222 220 217 221 219 216 222 220 217 
(10) (11) 
1.24 1.21 
(24.03) (22.90) 
-0.33 -0.29 
(-6.21) (-5.55) 
0.35 0.34 
(9.57) (9.98) 
0.25 0.31 
(5.27) (6.78) 
I I 
I I 
0.36*** I 
(2.62) 
I 0.40* 
(1.7S) 
0.99 0.99 
180628.8 143553.8 
2.02 2.01 
221 219 
(12) 
1.24 
(23.46) 
-0.33 j 
(-6.27) 
0.34 
(9.30) 
0.25 
(5.28) 
I 
I 
0.33* 
(1.85) 
0.15 
(0.52) 
0.99 
136026.4 
2.03 
216 
I 
co 
M 
I 
Table 6: FGLS estimates of a model in dirrerences with cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (20 OEeD countries, cross-section specific constants) 
. 
-
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (II) (I2) 
Instrument for the change in the -0.14 -0.18 -0.19 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.17 -0.24 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 
unemployment rate (-1) ( -2.07) (-2.65) -2.67) (-1.73) (-1.55) (-2.09) (-2.23) (-2.51) (-4.40) (-1.62) (-1.57) (-2.08) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.30 -0.28 -0.24 -0.30 -0.30 -0.27 -0.29 -0.29 -0.18 -0.30 -0.30 -0.28 
(-10.62) (-10.23) (-8.66) (-12.40) (-12.27) H 1.26) (-10.55) (-10.77) (-9.19) (-12.17) (-12.49) (-11.51 ) 
.­
Real GDP growth rate (-1) I I I -0.23 -0.22 -0.22 I I I -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 
(-9.46) (-9.05) (-8.95) (-8.92) (-9.05) ( -8.17) 
I 
.:. Change in early stage -0.45* I -0.72*** -0.62*** I -0.90*** I I I I I I 
f 'entuTe eapUal in,estment (-1.67) (-2.51) (-2.77) (-4.36) 
Change in early stage I -0.48 -0.62* I -0.87 -0.32 I I I I I I 
'IIenture eapual in'llestment (-I) (-LlO) (-1.58) (-0.23) (-1.30) 
Change in I I I I I I -0.24** I -0.53*** -0.08 I -0.13 
'IIenture eapual in'llestment (-2.31) (-4.90) (-0.97) (-1.35) 
Change in I I I I I I I -0.18 -0.34*** I -0.08 -0.15 
'IIenture eapual in'llestment (-I) (-1.27) (-3.14) (-0.73) ( -1.29) 
Weir;:.hted statistics 
R2 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.69 0.67 0.99 0.78 0.77 0.77 
F-statistics 78.91 75.61 54.80 1l1.31 98.10 91.23 82.97 76.30 37.99 101.36 98.01 77.84 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 1.93 1.93 1.90 1.98 1.96 1.94 1.92 1.75 1.93 1.98 1.96 
Total panel observations 174 172 169 173 171 168 174 172 169 173 171 168 
b) Impact of the delivery of venture capital on employment (with cyclical control) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Instrument for the change in 
employment (-I) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.08 
(1.74) 
0.09 
(1.83) 
0.10 
(1.94) 
0.03 
(0.33) 
0.01 
(7.24) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(1.77) 
0.09 
0.86) 
0.09 
(1.72) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.37 
(7.61) 
0.36 
(7.39) 
0.37 
(7.33) 
0.46 
(11.33) 
0.46 
(11.41) 
0.48 
(11.20) 
0.36 
(7.50) 
0.35 
(2.57) 
.0.34 
(6.88) 
0.46 
(11.36) 
0.46 
(11.49) 
0.46 
(11.19) . 
Real GDP growth rate (-I) I I I 0.39 
(9.84) 
0.42 
(10.38) 
0.41 
(9.90) 
I I I 0.39 
(9.79) 
0.40 
(10.06) 
0.38 
(9.34) 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment 
0.30 
(0.66) 
I 0.29 
(0.64) 
-0.03 
( -0.08) 
I -0.18 
(-0.44) 
I I I I I I 
Change in early stage 
venture capital investment (-1) 
I 0.76 
(0.85) 
0.76 
(0.83) 
I -0.83 
(-1.10) 
-1.00 
(-1.27) 
I I I I I I 
Change in 
venture capital investment 
I I I I I I 0.20 
(1.06) 
I 0.45** 
(2.10) 
-0.03 
(-0.17) 
I 0.10 
(0.55) 
Change in 
venture capital investment (-1) 
I I I I I I I o.n*** 
(2.57) 
0.91*** 
(3.32) 
I 0.34* 
(1.63) 
0.36· 
(1.64) 
Weighted stati.s.tics 
fll 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.78 0.78 0.78 . 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.78 0.78 0.78 
F-statistics 78.78 74.58 53.54 145.45 138.54 109.61 78.45 79.43 58.75 58.75 142.45 140.22 
Durbin-Watson 1.98 1.95 1.97 1.95 1.96 1.95 2.00 1.95 1.96 1.95 1.96 1.94 
Total panel observations 183 
'
181 
--­
178 
'--­
182 180 177 183 181 
'------. 
178 
-­
178 182 180 
I 
o 
-:r 
I 
Table 7: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the level of unemployment augmented by indicators of the capital, labor and product market setting 
I 
.,.... 
Unemployment rate (-I) 
a) Without venture capital variable 
1.38 (33.68) 
b) With INVEARLY (-I) 
1.36 (30.92) 
c) With VC (0) 
1.34 (32.29) 
Unemployment rate (-2) 
Real GDP growth rate 
-0.49 (-11.82) 
-0.24 (-12.33) 
-0.47 (-10.63) 
-0.23 (-11.32) 
-0.46 (-11.17) 
-0.23 (-11.55) 
Dummy Germany OJ4 (1.78) 0.22 (2.54) 0.29 (3.28) 
Early stllge venture capiIDJ investment (-1) I ·0.60** (-2.28) I 
Venture capital investment (0) I I -0.26**'" (-3.63) 
Benefit duration 
Employer coordination index 
0.10 (3.26) 
-0.27 (-3.45) 
0.09 (3.14) 
-0.31 (-3.7) 
0.11 (3.79) 
-0.33 (-4.11) 
Employment protection index 0.04 (3.57) 0.03 (2.90) 0.03 (3.06) 
Tax wedge om (2.28) om (2.62) . 0.02 (3.68) 
Union density om (3.26) om (3.37) om (2.96) 
Shareholder rights OJ (2.78) 0.08 (2.30) I 
Barriers to entrepeneurship 
Creditor rights 
I 
-0.17 (-3.87) 
I 
-0.19 (-4.08) 
-0.24 (-2.92) 
-0.24 (-5.15) 
Constant 
Weir.l!ted 5.tgti5.ti~ Jl1 
0.38 (1.20) 
0.98 
0.41 (1.22) 
0.99 
1.03 (4.23) 
0.99 
F-statistics 1197.53 1122.65 1175.27 
Durbin-Watson 
Total panel observations 
-, 
1.85 
229 
~. 
1.86 
211 
1.85 
213 
Table 8: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the level of employment augmented by indicators of the capital, labor and product market setting 
b) With INVEARLY (-1) c) WithVC (0) a) Without venture capital variable 
Total employment (-1) 0.98 (44.82)1.00 (54.85) 0.99 (45.05) 
0.45 (10.78) 0.46 (10.91)0.50 (12.64)Real GDP growth rate 
-0.68 (-3.54) -0.71 (-3.69) Dummy Gennany -0.65 (-3.54) 
2.05*** (3.77)Early Slage venture capital investment (-1) II 
0.39*** (2.59) Venture capital investment (0) I I 
-0.02 (-1.93) -0.03 (-2.51) -0.02 (-2.03) Benefit replacement ratio 
0.04(3.91)Benefit replacement ratio (RR 1) 0.04 (4.22) 0.03 (2.85) 
Benefit replacement ratio (RR25) 0.03 (2.14) II 
-0.13 (-1.97) -0.20 (-2.16) -0.14 (-2.05) Benefit duration 
-1.23 (-3.35) -0.51 (-1.45) Employer coordination index -Ll9 (-3.38) 
0.76(3.04) 0.45 (1.63) 0.83 (3.23)Coordination index 
-0.48 (-2.81) Employment protection index (NEWEP) -0.60 (-3.63) -0.28 (-1.62) 
-0.03 (-2.16) -0.03 (-2.71) -0.02 (-1.74) Tax wedge 
-0.03 (-3.73) -0.03 (-3.64) -0.03 (-3.95) Union density 
-0.24 (-2.56) -0.22 (-2.22) Shareholder rights I 
Creditor rights 0.34 (3.04) 0.40 (3.15) 0.34 (2.95) 
2.57 (1.53) 4.05 (1.95)Constant 3.490.71) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99Weighted slatisti!,;S. 
29077.25 20496.03F-statistics 29102.04 
Durbin-Watson 1.43 1.45 1.42 
253 236Total panel observations 221 
, 
I 

N 

...:t 
I 
I 
Table 9: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the first difference of unemployment augmented by indicators of the capital. labor and product market settinl 
I 
+:­
w 
I 
a) Without venture capital variable b) With INVEARLY (0) c) With vc (0) 
Instrument for D (Unemployment (-1)) 
-0.10 (-1.73) -0.13 (-1.90) -0.13 (-2.05) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.32 (-12.93) -0.30 (-11.4S) -0.31 (-12.03) 
D (Dummy Germany) 0.30 (2.29) 0.21 (1.57) I 
D (Early stage venture capital investment) I -0.39 (-1.39) 
-
I 
D (Venture capital investment (0)) I I -0.26** (-2.41) 
Benefit replacement ratio 0.00 (1.26) 0.01(1.51) om (1.62) 
Benefit replacement ratio (RR25) -0.02 (-2.0S) -0.02 (-2.14) -0.02 (-2.2S) 
Benefit duration 0.19 (3.38) 0.16 (2.67) 0.17 (2.84) 
Employment protection index (NEWEP) 0.10 (1.63) 0.11 (1.74) 0.12 (1.88) 
Union density om (2.31) om (I.S9) om (1.92) 
Creditor rights -0.17 (-2.32) -0.14 (-1.74) -0.14 (-1.71) 
i 
AR(l) 0.40 (4.89) 0.41 (4.76) 0.41 (4.97) 
W:f.il:.bt.~d. stalisti,s Rl 0.70 0.68 0.68 
I 
F -statistics 44.42 33.10 37.25 
Durbin-Watson 1.92 I.S9 1.93 
i 
Total panel observations 178 167 167 
I 
Table 10: FGLS estimates of a pooled model for the first difference of employment augmented by indicators of the capital, labor and product market setting 
a) Without venture capital variahle b) With INVEARLY (0) c) With VC (-1) 
1nstr. for D (Employment (-1)) 
-0.15 (-2.20) -0.08 (-1.17) -0.15 (-2.21) 
--­
Real GDP growth rate 0.50 (10.71) 0.33 (7.43) 0.44 (9.14) 
D (Early stage venture capital investment (0» I 0.90·· (1.90) I 
D (Venture capital investment (-1» I I 0.74··· (2.81) 
Benefit replacement ratio (RRl) 0.02 (2.03) I 0.02(1.61) 
Benefit replacement ratio (RR25) 0.04 (1.97) I 0.04 (2.12) 
Benefit duration -0.49 (-2.47) -0.38 (-2.19) -0.57 (-2.82) 
Union coverage index. 1.03 (1.80) 2.42 (3.52) 1.31 (2.44) 
Employer coordination index. -0.61 (-2.09) I -0.59 (-2.06) 
Employment protection index. (NEWEP) -0.99 (-2.76) -1.51 (-3.33) -0.89 (-2.66) 
Barriers to entrepreneurship 2.39 (3.49) 2.05 (2.71) 2.95 (3.57) 
Shareholder rights 0.70 (3.31) 0.76(2.99) 0.88 (3.59) 
Creditor rights 1.04 (3.56) 0.65 (2.21) UO (3.49) 
AR(J} 0.38 (4.61) 0.50 (6.68) 0.34 (4.00) 
Weif:.hted s.lgtisti£,I R" 0.66 0.60 0.66 
F-statistics 28.10 26.26 21.82 
Durbin-Watson 2.04 2.04 1.99 
Total panel observations 186 183 174 
I 
~ 
~ 
I 
Table 11: Dynamic labor-market impacts of venture capital investment 
Specification Table 7c 
(VC) 
Table lOb (INVEARLY) Table JOc 
(VC) 
a) Short-run 
impact effect 
-0.26 0.90 0.74 
b) Long-run 
equilibrium effect 
-2.17 0.83 0.68 
c) Std. dev. ofventure capital 
variable 
0.52 0.20 0.52 
d) Impact effect of 
one std. dev. shock 
= a) times c) 
-0.14 0.18 0.38 
e) Equilibrium effect ofone std. 
dev. shock"" b) times c) 
-1.13 0.17 0.35 
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